What does the second military coup d’etat really mean for the region, for Russia and for the West?
31st October 2022
In the aftermath of a military coup d’état in Burkina Faso in January 2022, countries across West Africa and in the West adopted a measured and cautiously optimistic approach. It was their calculated bid to prevent a repeat of the situation in Mali where the military junta was cosying up with Russia.
Yet only 9 months later, on Friday 30th September, a second coup d’état took place in Burkina Faso - just days after the soon-to-be-ousted President, Lt. Col. Paul Henry Sandaogo Damiba, had paraded the level of acceptance he had achieved on the international stage by meeting with senior diplomats at the UN General Assembly in New York. The coup was not a complete surprise – the political instability had been bubbling up for months as the authorities failed to hold back the tide of insecurity, but it leaves the international community in an uncertain landscape, wondering which path the country will now take.
So, as the dust settles, where next for Burkina Faso and what should international observers be watching for?
1) Is Burkina Faso pivoting to Russia and will Wagner have a role?
As a former colonial power in the Sahel and acting as the main Western security actor in the region during the last decade, France is increasingly being blamed for its failures and facing a wave of protests mounting across the Sahel. As the recent coup unfolded, protestors attacked the French embassy and a French cultural institute whilst chanting and waving Russian flags. The spokesperson for the incoming junta further fuelled anti-French resentment stating that Lt. Damiba, the ousted President, was being harboured in a French military base. The coup was praised by Yevgeny Prigozhin, leader of the Russian mercenary company known as “Wagner group”, aiming to expand and consolidate its strategic presence in the Sahel. However, Russia does not seem to have a direct role in the coup, which seems to have been a dispute between internal factions of the army. A potential Russian expansion had been anticipated due to the growing misinformation campaigns carried out in the past months involving pro-Russia NGOs which spread fake news on France’s role in subsidising jihadist movements.
The new authorities however have gone some way to allay fears. Following his nomination on 21st October, the new prime minister, Apollinaire Joachim Kyelem de Tambela, defended the idea of multiplying partners. He advocated that rather than cutting the country off from any of them - neither France nor Russia - they should be used for what they are able to contribute to Burkina Faso. Encouragingly for the West to hear, he added that the country had cooperated with Russia in the past but he believed that the Russia of Vladimir Putin is not the solution.
In addition, the new President Capitaine Ibrahim Traoré stated that the country should focus on building internal capacity in its fight against terrorism rather than looking for help from any of the current or potential partners. The President also made a clear case, aligned with “Sankarist” principles, that Burkina Faso should not be too reliant on external stakeholders. Just a few days ago though, the U.S. Under Secretary for Political Affairs Victoria Nuland said that Traoré had assured U.S. diplomats during a visit that he has no intention of inviting Russian Wagner forces to fight militants in the country.
Next door in Mali, beneath the manipulated media coverage, Russia is failing to have a significant impact on curbing the jihadist presence. In fact, they are being blamed and monitored for human rights violations and abuses inflicted on the civilian population. The war in Ukraine has forced Russia to reshape its foreign strategies, including the deployment of Wagner group contractors. When Russia invaded Ukraine last February, Wagner contractors were still deployed in several countries in Africa including Mali, Libya, Central African Republic, Mozambique, Sudan and Madagascar. As the Russian offensive has dragged on, however, Wagner troops have been recalled from Libya (and Syria) to serve in Ukraine. Given that the contingent present in Mali remains unchanged, it seems that the Wagner group could deploy contractors to Burkina Faso, were it requested to by the government. As French security presence in the region pivots to Niger, the importance of Ouagadougou for Paris lies now predominantly in the war of influence with Russia.
2) Will the new authorities hold to the transition timetable on elections or drag their heels on the road back to democracy?
Captain Ibrahim Traoré, the new president, has promised to respect the timeline of return to civilian rule by July 2024. The 34-year-old captain was one of the young officers who participated in Lieutenant Colonel Damiba's coup against President Roch Marc Christian Kaboré. Days after the latest coup, Burkina Faso's new military leaders finally met with a delegation from the West African regional bloc ECOWAS, after anti-ECOWAS protesters gathered outside the designated conference venue. Captain Traoré assured the West African regional bloc ECOWAS soon after the coup that Ouagadougou would continue to respect commitments made by Damiba, namely the organisation of elections and a return of civilians to power by July 2024 at the latest. In addition, in the transitional charter it is stated that the President of the transition, his Prime Minister, and other high officials are forbidden to present themselves for presidential, legislative, or municipal election at the end of the transition.
Whether or not this timeline, and these commitments, are kept to is a crucial litmus test.
The wider picture in the region is mixed. Recent events in nearby Sahelian country Chad, show a country that paid lip service to a transition to democracy and peace reconciliation, however both are now at stake. In the same week as the coup in Burkina Faso, a National Dialogue in Chad ended with the decision to extend the transition period a further 18 months and allow the leader of the transitional government, Mahamat Deby – son of former dictator Idrissa Deby, to run as a presidential candidate.
3) Will the coup accelerate the spread of violence to the neighbouring coastal states?
Instability and insecurity in Burkina Faso have wider regional implications, particularly given the spread of the jihadist presence and attacks in bordering countries, namely Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana, Benin, and Togo. The states of the Gulf of Guinea have seen an increasing number of attacks already this year, with national governments as well as the international community rushing to reshape their strategies to counter violent extremists and prevent further proliferation of violence. Last year, France’s foreign intelligence service revealed that al-Qaeda-linked fighters had plans in place to spread their attacks in the Gulf of Guinea, particularly to Benin and Cote d’Ivoire.
Given the quick expansion of the jihadist presence in the Sahel, the upcoming months will be crucial to bolstering the capacity of coastal states in the fight to maintain control of bordering areas. Evidence shows that solutions must start with a significant increase in public services and infrastructure which foster educational and economic opportunities for the large youth population. This approach begins to address root causes, rather than dealing with the consequences through a purely securitised response. This, coupled with early and consistent engagement and reinforcement of social cohesion among the population, in combination with a coordinated and appropriate military response can start to make inroads and help to eventually contain the threat. Both the central Sahel and its coastal neighbours need coordinated and synergistic national security leadership and enhanced counterterrorism approaches and partnerships if they are going stave off this growing threat.
4) How is the crisis exacerbating the humanitarian situation and increase in IDPs?
Analysis on acute malnutrition reveals that 699,000 children aged 6–59 months are expected to be acutely malnourished throughout 2022, an increase of 10 percent compared to the last analysis (October 2020–July 2021) and an increase in severe acute malnutrition cases of over 18% compared to last year (IPC, 2021). A combination of factors have led to this; a rise in attacks and insecurity that have disrupted planting and harvest, lower agricultural yield due to climate change, the restructuring of the economy away from agriculture towards gold, and the disruption to global food supply chains. This hass led to a 14.7% increase in the price of food (World Bank 2021) with a worrying number of people falling into food insecurity. A recent report by FAO shows that 2.4 million people are now facing a food crisis in CH 3 or food emergency in CH 4 (rating of food insecurity). In just one year, the number of people in CH 4 (has increased by over 146,000 to 300,000 people. These statistics are worrying in and of themselves, but they also contribute to a vicious cycle of conflict, insecurity, and hunger as a downward spiral in socio-economic conditions that can lead to more disillusionment with the state and, in some cases leaving little choice but to turn to non-state armed groups.
Just as worrying is the number of internally displaced people in Burkina Faso, which has increased dramatically in the last five years, from under 5000 in 2017 to nearly two million today (UNICEF). A tracker for internally displaced people in Burkina Faso from the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre links over 200,000 internal displacements to insecurity n the period from April to August 2022 alone. The deterioration of the security conditions in the country has been shown to have a direct impact on the number of IDPs in country as the increase of violent attacks caused more people to flee in six months - between January and July 2022 (398,471) than during the entire year of 2021 (335,723) (Norweigan Refugee Council, 2022). An estimated 60% of the internally displaced people are children, who combined with forced closures of schools, leads to an endemic lack of education problem. Over 4,000 schools in Burkina Faso have been forced to close due to conflict which is roughly 17% of all schools in the country (Relief Web, 2022). With a second coup in a year, the question everyone is asking is will an already dire, and largely ignored situation, become even worse?
5) Will Burkina align closer with Mali and Guinea, and how should ECOWAS respond?
In the days following the coup d’etat, ECOWAS issued three different statements - at first condemning the coup d’etat, then praising the parties for finding a peaceful resolution. An ECOWAS mission to Ouagadougou took place Tuesday 4th October, led by the former President of Niger, Mahamadou Issoufou, the ECOWAS mediator for Burkina Faso. Issoufou declared that he was “satisfied” with the mission and recalled the commitment of ECOWAS to abide by the original transition plan, reassured by the new leader’s willingness to observe the agreed electoral deadline.
Burkina Faso's new strongman and his close guard have also begun all-out consultations with political actors within the country and external partners. In a note verbale, the State Protocol informed the heads of diplomatic missions and international organizations that they were invited on 7th October to a meeting with Ibrahim Traoré and he reassured them of his continued engagement. In addition, the structure of the new government which has kept 5 ministers from Damiba’s government, and promoted many former Ministerial General Secretaries to the status of ministers, shows that we can expect a certain continuity from the former government. As the situation gradually calms down, the ability of the new authorities to contain anti-ECOWAS and anti-French protests is crucial. At least officially, the new leaders have not engaged yet publicly with fellow coup leaders in Mali and Guinea, but Western countries will worry that this new influx of military leaders will forge closer ties with each other and Russia to disrupt stability in the Sahel and West Africa more broadly.
So, how should international partners react?
1. Keep focusing on the long-term aim – peace and security in the Sahel
With a longer-term vision for peace and stability in the Sahel, Western countries should be careful not to overreact and push Burkina Faso into the hands of the Kremlin. As well as the geopolitical dangers of this, Russian military presence has shown itself not to be effective in security, to condone human rights abuses and to thrive in situations of poor governance. Captain Ibrahim Traoré has committed to the ECOWAS deadline for transition and expressed interest in partnering with countries like the U.S. Disproportionate measures could dissuade the coup leader from sticking to these commitments and encourage him to forge closer ties with Russia as an option of last resort. However, this must be done whilst not condoning a failure of democracy which could have ripples across the region.
2. The security-driven approach in central Sahel has shown its limits
The new appointed transition government in Burkina Faso has announced its priorities. In addition to the main priority of security, the Prime Minister has announced two other priorities: improving the quality of life of Burkinabès and improving the system of governance. This is a recognition from Sahelians themselves that a security-only approach has its limits. Partners must continue their efforts and support for development projects and the strengthening of governance and government systems, which tackle the root causes of an environment that is more susceptible to the spread of violent extremism.
3. Keep this region top of mind – there is too much to lose by ignoring it or placing it in a box labelled ‘too hard’
The region has arguably the fastest accelerating conflict in the world. The coup in Burkina Faso is far from an isolated incident. Rather, it is one of many concurrent crises which have complied and converged to make the situation in the Sahel one of the most pressing issues for the international community and the full west coast of Africa – with the risk of opening up space for additional challenges to arrive from the north of Africa and the eastern Sahel. The depth and complexity of the situation can put off attempts to resolve these crises, but the international community cannot let the Sahel fall and ignore the growing humanitarian crisis.
4. Use the regional momentum for collaboration and solution-finding
International partners outside of the Sahel and West Africa should have confidence in Sahelians; although the region is currently facing some challenges, there are many receptive actors in the region who are willing and able to support and lead peace efforts and find long term solutions for stability and development. Initiatives like the growing support for re-engaging with the Accra Initiative show this thinking in action. International efforts that are most open to collaboration with the regional bloc ECOWAS, and countries like Cote D’Ivoire, Ghana, Senegal, Togo and Benin, will find that they are much more likely to see practical results.
Briefing first published by the Labour Group for Foreign Policy
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